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Abstract
Despite spells outside parliament, with its blend of nationalist and populist appeals the Slovak National Party (SNS) has
been a prominent fixture on Slovakia’s political scene for three decades. Unlike some of the newer parties in Slovakia
and across the region, partly as a product of the point of its (re‐)creation, SNS has a comparable organizational density
to most established parties in the country and has invested in party branches and recruiting members. Although ordinary
members exercised some power and influence during the fissiparous era of the early 2000s, SNS has been notable for
the role played by its leader in decision‐making and steering the party. Each leader placed their stamp on the projection,
pitch and functioning of the party, both as a decision‐making organization and an electoral vehicle. Ordinary members
have been largely—but not exclusively—relegated to the role of cheerleaders and campaigners for the party’s tribunes; a
situation which has not changed significantly in the era of social media. The pre‐eminent position of the leader and the
limited options for “voice” has led unsuccessful contenders for top posts and their supporters to opt instead for “exit.”
Despite having some of the traits of the mass party and having engaged in some of the activities common for mass parties,
especially in the earlier years of its existence, in more recent times in particular, SNS falls short of the mass party model
both in aspiration and reality.
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1. Introduction
Slovenská národná strana (SNS, The Slovak National
Party) has been one of the perennials of party politics
in Slovakia. Even though it lost its parliamentary repre‐
sentation in 2002 and 2012, it managed to bounce back
at the subsequent election regaining seats in parliament
and go straight into government. Although never the
main partner, SNS served in several coalitions in Slovakia
including a junior role in the 2016–2020 government; a
role that cost the party at the 2020 elections when it
again lost its representation in parliament. Yet despite its
prominent role in Slovak politics, apart from one contri‐
bution to an edited volume (Hudek, 2004) and an article
(Konečný & Zetocha, 2005), both published a decade and
a half ago, it has not been the subject of a specific study.
Coverage of SNS is usually wrapped up in stud‐
ies of parties in general (e.g., Dolný & Malová, 2016;
Ondruchová, 2000; Rybář, 2011), Slovakia’s political tra‐
jectory (e.g., Fisher, 2006), or the fate of the radical right
across Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Bustikova, 2020;
Pirro, 2015). In contrast, the neofascist right, Ľudová
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stranaNaše Slovensko (ĽSNS, People’s PartyOur Slovakia)
led by Marian Kotleba which won 8% in the 2016 and
2020 elections has attracted much more scholarly atten‐
tion (e.g., Harris, 2019; Voda et al., 2021). In a party sys‐
tem and a region where many parties live fast and die
young and where failure to cross the electoral threshold
is usually a nail in a party’s coffin, SNS deserves atten‐
tion both for its endurance and its ability to bounce back
from poor election results—a feat it has achieved twice.
Moreover, in light of this thematic issue’s focus on orga‐
nizational structures, SNS is notable for being a strongly
centralized party with its leader having almost dictato‐
rial powers. This structure accords the party (or rather
the leader) some flexibility, but it also poses a risk as the
party’s fortunes becomehighly contingent on the captain
of the ship.
This article seeks to provide an examination of SNS,
in particular its organizational structures. Two charac‐
teristics of the party’s organization are striking. Firstly,
although the party is both formally and in practice leader‐
driven, SNS has thrown out its leader several times, on
one occasion causing a damaging split. Secondly, the
party has a much more developed organizational struc‐
ture than some of the newer parties in the country, but
a comparable membership and organizational structure
to other long‐standing parties. Both of these observa‐
tions highlight two themes that run through this arti‐
cle: The fate of the party has been inextricably linked
to questions surrounding the leadership of the party;
and the organizational structures of SNS and parties in
general in Slovakia are best seen as products of tim‐
ing. There is, therefore, a “generation effect” dependent
on when a party was born (van Biezen, 2005). In line
with broader findings from across Central and Eastern
Europe, in terms of organization, older parties tend to
resemble one another as do newer ones whatever ide‐
ological persuasion they may have. Older parties tend
to have more well‐developed organizational structures
(larger memberships, etc.), whereas newer parties have
lighter organizational structures and tend to be much
more reliant on new forms of communication (Haughton
& Deegan‐Krause, 2020). Although the latter character‐
istics are no bars to success in the short‐term—in fact
they can even be an advantage—well‐developed organi‐
zational structures cushion blows when parties lose sup‐
port and accord them a better chance of being able to
bounce back.
There is a significant body of literature examining
party organization in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g.,
Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2021; Ibenskas, 2014; Kitschelt
et al., 1999; Tavits, 2013), exploring the role organiza‐
tion has played in the fate of political parties highlight‐
ing the role of legacies and choices made by parties. Our
study forms part of a thematic issue featuring numerous
case studies focused on whether the mass party model
endures in contemporary Europe, particularly among
those parties which have been labelled radical right and
right‐wing populist parties. As the editors’ close reading
of the literature shows (Albertazzi & van Kessel, 2021),
the key features of the mass party organizational model
include a drive to recruit a large activist membership
as a way of reaching out to the public, rootedness on
the ground, and the provision of a variety of activities
to members.
We argue that there are somediscernible traits of the
mass party model present in the history of SNS. In the
1990s, in line with many of the other parties in parlia‐
ment at the time, the party did invest in an organiza‐
tional model which at least aimed towards the involve‐
ment of grassroots activists and the shaping of political
identities akin to the mass party model, especially in its
heartlands (Deegan‐Krause, 2000; Heinisch &Mazzoleni,
2016). Moreover, in the 1990s the party had links to var‐
ious nationalist organizations. By the time it returned to
government in 2016 after its second spell without par‐
liamentary representation, however, the party may have
been more mass‐like than many of the newer parties in
Slovakia, but it fell well short of the mass party model.
The party, for instance, had little to no ancillary orga‐
nization that would or could socialize party members.
Moreover, the attachment of voters andmembers to the
party has been rather weak. Following a dramatic drop
in electoral support combined with the loss of over 55%
of its members, since losing its parliamentary represen‐
tation for a second time in 2020, the party’s focus has
been primarily on survival.
Following the common framework of this thematic
issue, this article begins by providing an account of the
party’s ideology and historical development, before turn‐
ing to the questions of organizational structure and the
role of the leader raised by the editors in their introduc‐
tion. As the timing of SNS’s formation and leadership
choices is central to understanding the form, content,
and dynamic of SNS, we devote more space in this con‐
tribution than others to the historical development of
the party.
2. The Trajectory of the Slovak National Party
Although officially registered as a party on 7March 1990,
SNS has consistently claimed links to the original Slovak
National Party formed in 1871 (e.g., Slovenská národná
strana, 2015; Slovenská národná strana, 2019, Article II
§ 3 No. 2). The creation—orwhat some in SNSwould pre‐
fer to see as the re‐creation—of the party owed much
to the rekindling of the debate about Slovakia’s place
in Czechoslovakia and the status of the Slovak language.
SNS, however, was not the only entity or even polit‐
ical party agitating on the national question (Malová,
2003). Whereas other parties, in particular Hnutie za
Democratické Slovensko (HZDS, the Movement for a
Democratic Slovakia), advocated greater autonomy, SNS
pushed for independence.
The break‐up of Czechoslovakia and the foundation
of an independent Slovak state in January 1993 opened
up a disputewithin SNS between the conservative‐liberal
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pragmatism of Ľudovit Černák who became the party’s
leader in October 1992, and a more radical nationalist
faction. The latter won the battle, removing Černák as
chairman and propelling Ján Slota to the leadership of
the party in February 1994. Slota set the ideological tone
for the party for the following quarter of a century. Ethnic
Hungarians (which made up around a tenth of the popu‐
lation of Slovakia) and their kin state were the main tar‐
get for Slota’s ire and boorish behaviour, but Slovakia’s
other significant ethnic minority, the Roma, were also
subject to his coarse tongue. Under Slota, SNSwas driven
by a desire to defend the integrity of the Slovak state, pro‐
mote Slovak culture, and ensure Slovak schools did not
become breeding grounds for Hungarian interests.
SNS’s nativist recipe proved appealing for a signifi‐
cant slice of the electorate at a succession of elections
(e.g., Krivý, 1999; Linek & Gyárfášová, 2020; see Table 1).
The party failed to cross the threshold in 2002 due to
a split linked to the leadership role of Slota which we
discuss below, but the fission was followed soon after
the election by a fusion. In 2006 the party achieved its
second‐best result (11.73%), not only returning to par‐
liament, but also as a junior party in government. But
this was a high‐water mark of popularity to which the
party never returned, although the party did achieve
8.64% and again became part of the governing coalition
in 2016.
SNS’s electoral decline owed much to the changing
context of politics, the loss of its standard‐bearer sta‐
tus and decisions made by larger parties. Central to
SNS’s appeal from the early 1990s had been its anti‐
Hungarian sentiment, but the potency of this rhetoric
waned as Slovakia’s years of independence and EUmem‐
bership grew. Moreover, the ethnic Hungarian vote itself
had split with a new party, Most‐Híd (taking the word
for bridge from both Slovak and Hungarian), seeking to
bridge the divide between the two ethnic groups. But
by the 2016 election, in the minds of voters the per‐
ceived threat to the Slovak nation came less from an
internal fifth column and more from the external threat
of immigration, a fear fuelled by Europe’s migration cri‐
sis (Pytlas, 2019). Nevertheless, by 2016 SNS had lost its
status as the standard‐bearer of Slovak nationalism. Not
only did the main ruling party Smer‐sociálna demokracia
(Smer‐SD, Direction‐Social Democracy) shift its rhetoric
in the latter half of 2015 and make “We defend Slovakia”
its main slogan, but the 2016 election saw the break‐
through of the neo‐fascist ĽSNS.
SNS entered government in 2016, but the very con‐
figuration of the 2016–2020 coalition sat uncomfortably
with a party espousing Slovak nationalism: One of SNS’s
coalition partners was Most‐Híd, whose support base
was drawn from ethnic Hungarians and liberal Slovaks
(Linek & Gyárfášová, 2020). But the period was also strik‐
ing for the rise in salience of the theme of governance
(and more specifically corruption), particularly after the
murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina
Kušnírová in 2018. Outrage at the murder and corrup‐
tion in the country generated the context for Obyčajní
ľudia a nezávislé osobnosti’s (OĽaNO, Ordinary People
and Independent Personalities) anti‐corruption appeal
to succeed and a drop in support for all the governing par‐
ties including SNS (Haughton et al., 2021). Nonetheless,
SNS’s slump also owed something to scandals surround‐
ing Danko himself. In 2020 the party lost its seats in par‐
liament, mustering a mere 3.16%.
3. More Than Many, but not Massive: Slovak National
Party’s Organization
Several studies of political parties in Slovakia have under‐
lined their low levels of membership, underdeveloped
territorial organizations, weak linkages with society and
organized interests, and high levels of financial depen‐
dency on the state (e.g., Dolný & Malová, 2016; Rybář,
2011). Nonetheless, there are some striking variations.
But these variations have less to do with parties’ place
on the ideological spectrum and more to do with when
theywere founded and how. Parties are products of their
time. Generally, the older the party, the more extensive
the party’s organizational structure. Given the central‐
ity of the party leadership to SNS’s organizational struc‐
ture we leave details of the party congress (which only
elected delegates can attend) and the composition of the
Table 1. Election results for SNS in parliamentary elections.
Election Votes (%) Seats in 150‐seat parliament % of seats in parliament
1990 13.94 22 14.7%
1992 7.93 15 10.0%
1994 5.40 9 6.0%
1998 9.07 14 9.3%
2002 3.32 0 0
2006 11.73 20 13.3%
2010 5.07 9 6.0%
2012 4.55 0 0
2016 8.64 15 10.0%
2020 3.16 0 0
Source: Slovak Statistical Office (2020).
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party’s Presidium (which is determined significantly by
the leader) until the following section.
Although we need to treat self‐reported member‐
ship figures for all parties with a pinch of salt given
the alleged inflation of those figures, the official figures
stated in reports submitted to theMinistry of the Interior
remain the most reliable guide. As Table 2 highlights,
membership varies significantly. SNS and the other par‐
ties founded in the 1990s have considerably higher levels
of membership. Even Smer‐SD, which had begun life as
the project of one man, embarked on a deliberate strat‐
egy of party building in the aftermath of its disappoint‐
ing election result in 2002 and has relatively high levels
of membership. In contrast, two of the parties that per‐
formed well in the 2020 elections and went into govern‐
ment, Sloboda a Solidarita (SaS, Freedom and Solidarity)
and OĽaNO, have low levels of membership, the latter’s
membership limited for most of its existence to the four
founding figures of the party. Both parties were formed a
decade ago, born in an new era wheremass organization
seemed so passé, so 20th century.
The membership figures in Table 2, however, are
striking not just for the stark differences in headline
figures between older and newer parties, but also
the trends. The two parties with the largest members,
Smer‐SD and the Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie (KDH,
Christian Democratic Movement) have either a stable
(the former) or a declining (the latter) level of member‐
ship from the mid‐2000s. In contrast, there is a marked
increase in SNSmembership in themid‐2010s. The rise in
members of SNS after 2012 owes something to an injec‐
tion of additional effort into recruitment. But the great‐
est boost came from the departure of the controversial
leader Ján Slota and his replacement by Andrej Danko
who was very much seen as an asset for the party until
the party entered government again in 2016. The sharp
fall in party membership since the 2020 elections (down
from 7,728 to 3,469) owesmuch to the negative reaction
to Danko’s decision to run again for re‐election.
The decision to grow SNS’s party membership was
linked to two key factors. Firstly, growing membership
had an important signalling function. After the years of
decline under Slota, a growth in membership helped
to send a signal out to the wider electorate that the
party was vibrant and relevant. Secondly, Danko and
the new leadership of the party were keen to empha‐
size the importance of members. Membership was seen
as a sign not just of the party’s virility, but also of its
ties to the electorate. Here there is an important ele‐
ment not just of the mass party model, but also of what
we might label a populist appeal. In contrast to several
new and popular political parties that have few mem‐
bers, Danko was keen to project his party as one of ordi‐
nary Slovaks in contrast to parties like OĽaNO that claim
to represent ordinary people, but are—in Danko’s eyes
at least—simply pet projects of political entrepreneurs.
Although these signalling motivations mattered, another
driving force at this point arguably was simply the bot‐
tom line. The party neededmoney. As Figure 1 illustrates,
between 2006 and 2011 when the party was in parlia‐
ment, state funding provided a large proportion of the
party’s income, but SNS’s loss of seats in 2012 led to
four years in which the party needed to turn to other
sources of income. Membership fees became more sig‐
nificant for the party during SNS’s second stint as an
extra‐parliamentary party, but those revenue streams
were overshadowed by loans it took out. SNS borrowed
heavily including €759,100 worth of loans in 2015 and
€1,259,750 in 2016. Moreover, official reports suggest
that the vast majority of the party’s membership con‐
tributions actually came from a narrow group of top
party officials, raising some doubt about ultimately how
important ordinary members were to the generation
of revenue.
Table 2.Membership figures.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
SNS 1,198 1,370 1,531 1,617 1,839 2,412 2,335 3,130 3,884 6,155 7,189 7,489 7,604 7,728
Smer‐ 15,132 15,855 15,636 16,263 16,869 15,817 16,376 16,543 16,167 15,862 15,605 15,182 14,626 14,136
SD
KDH 17,814 15,927 14,964 14,645 15,360 14,704 13,024 12,031 11,704 11,180 9,807 8,948 8,796 8,048
SMK 11,959 11,964 11,745 10,950 10,750 10,950 9,800 10,040 10,320 10,075 9,256 9,197 9,119 9,233
Most‐ — — — 1,288 4,029 4,642 4,892 5,098 5,350 5,414 5,583 5,492 5,527 5,547
Híd
ĽSNS — — — 4 11 99 162 193 45 96 796 1,439 1,510 1,460
SaS — — — 195 271 281 292 192 166 154 164 189 205 188
OLaNO — — — — — 4 4 4 4 4 13 13 4 45
Sme — — — — — — — — — — 450 638 1,338 1,684
Rodina
Source: Národná rada Slovenskej republiky and Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky (2006–2019).
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Figure 1. SNS income. Source: Národná rada Slovenskej republiky and Ministerstvo vnútra Slovenskej republiky
(2006–2019).
Although the impetus for increasing membership
came from the SNS leadership, the party’s recruitment
drive was largely a product of people‐to‐people persua‐
sion. While we do not have robust enough data to make
definitive arguments, it was striking in the 2012–2016
period how much SNS’s membership drive and general
campaigning was concentrated not on political gath‐
erings, but rather on popular and community events
like municipal or regional fairs, Christmas markets, etc.,
where the local and regional party activists would dis‐
tribute leaflets and have stalls to “sell” the party along‐
side craftspeople selling their goods.
Reflective of the increased connectivity of citizens of
Slovakia, the use of socialmedia and the internet became
more important after 2016, but our analysis of SNS’s
website and Facebook feed highlights that these mod‐
ern tools were more often than not used to persuade
readers and followers to attend meetings and events
where formal recruitment would take place. As one of
the reviewers of this manuscript suggested, two addi‐
tional sources of new members may have also played
a role in the increased membership. Firstly, a number
of politicians associated with the once dominant party
of Slovak politics, HZDS, became part of the SNS leader‐
ship and parliamentary representation after 2016, indi‐
cating one source of new members was former support‐
ers and members of HZDS. Secondly, close friends and
family members of existing members may have joined
SNS to help bolster the overall figures. Whilst there is
anecdotal evidence of both of these phenomena, it is not
possible, however, to say from existing data sources how
widespread and significant these have been.
In a similar vein to membership, the extent of party
organizational structures was far more developed in
those parties formed in the 1990s to those in more
recent times. SNS built significant local and regional
structures in their early years, especially in its heartland
of North and Central Slovakia, although these structures
were far less developed both in terms of the number
of paid employees and party branches than other par‐
liamentary parties formed in the 1990s (Ondruchová,
2000). The regional structures played an active role in
the party’s successful national election campaign in 2016
organizing dozens of meetings, but four years later there
was far less activity. For the entire month of January, the
sum total of the activity of regional structures appeared
to be a football tournament and an event marking the
handing over of a reconstructed Cultural Centre (Šnídl,
2020b). But even the role of the regional structures in
SNS’s success in 2016 can be overstated. Media coverage
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of Danko, especially on the TV news channel TA3, signif‐
icantly contributed to the return of the party to parlia‐
ment after four years in the wilderness.
The party’s campaign in 2020 focused muchmore on
social media with the party spending the second high‐
est amount (€90,736) of any party on Facebook and
Instagram in the year before polling (Zelenayová, 2020).
But this was largely a centrally‐organized and conducted
social media campaign with a strong focus on the party
leader. Since the election, social media has become an
even more important tool for the party, due in part to
their extra‐parliamentary status, but also to the restric‐
tions associated with the Covid‐19 pandemic, whichmay
go some way to explaining the sum total of four physical
activities by SNS regional branches in the 12months from
March 2020. The leader‐centric nature of the party’s
communication strategy was also in evidence from the
videos posted on the party’swebsite,which for the entire
first year after the 2020 elections amounted to Danko’s
announcements and statements, even including a video
of the leader stating he was running for re‐election. His
opponent in the election, however, was not accorded the
same opportunity.
Danko himself was instrumental in initiating a new
party law in 2018 laying out minimal organizational
parameters of political parties running in parliamentary
elections. The motivation for this law was to hamper
SNS’s opponents (both existing and potential) and to
a lesser extent solidify Danko’s position inside his own
party. In terms of the former, in a clear swipe at some of
the opposition parties with underdeveloped party orga‐
nizations, SNS’s leader argued that its aim was to pre‐
vent rich political entrepreneurs from setting up or tak‐
ing over parties and making them their political tools
(“Danko: Zákon o,” 2019). Danko’s call for “normal regu‐
lar structures” was explicitly directed at OĽaNO and SaS
which, as Table 2 shows, only had 13 and 187 members
respectively at the time, but had defeated SNS candi‐
dates in regional elections in 2017. Moreover, Danko’s
call for tighter control of how a party leader spends party
funds helped shinemore light on allegations that Kotleba
had spent ĽSNS funds to purchase a private dwelling
rather than on his party headquarters. But it was strik‐
ing that the law passed in 2019 stopped short of intro‐
ducing effectivemeasures to increase intra‐party democ‐
racy and hence did not impinge on the unrestrained intra‐
party position of the SNS leader within his own party
(The National Council of the Slovak Republic, 2018).
Mass membership has not been central to SNS strat‐
egy (perhaps with the exception of the early 1990s,
when most relevant parties sought ties to societal orga‐
nizations and society at large via extensive member‐
ship). Because the party’s electoral failures were linked
to internal intra‐elite fights leading to splits, defections
and a loss of membership base, the party leaders who
took over were concerned with cementing their own
positions, and only then with repairing the basic party
infrastructure. District and regional party units had to
be rebuilt as they often ceased to exist due to defec‐
tions and/or expulsion of members. As various corrup‐
tion cases demonstrate, SNS—a frequent junior coalition
partner—has always attracted a portion of rent‐seeking
activists. In addition, although new party leaders tended
to act as magnets in membership recruitment, there
is little evidence of a sustained and deliberate effort
to encapsulate and socialize party members within the
party structures.
4. Leading the Way: The Role of the Party Leader
At the heart of the trajectory of SNS since its founda‐
tion in the early 1990s is a paradox. The party has been
one of the most leader‐dominated parties in Slovakia,
but has undergone no fewer than six leadership changes.
The party’s longest serving leader (chair), Slota, was cen‐
tral to two changes in the leadership. In 1999 he was
successfully challenged when 237 of 403 of the party’s
regional delegates voted to oust him; a decision Slota
reacted to by turning off the lights in the room and
declaring the vote invalid. Moreover, after a prolonged
period of tension he left the party along with several
other senior figures and formed a breakaway, the Pravá
Slovenská národná strana (PSNS, True Slovak National
Party). The fission proved damaging for both parties as
they both fell below the 5% electoral threshold, prompt‐
ing them to fuse in May 2003. Slota returned to the
leadership as party chair and his erstwhile nemesis, SNS
leader AnnaMalíková‐Belousovováwho had led the chal‐
lenge four years earlier, became first vice‐chair. The party
re‐unification was the single most important moment
in the organizational development of the party. Before
the party split, the key role of the party leader was
much more a matter of informal influence and power.
Since re‐unification, however, the party chair’s unshake‐
able position has been enshrined in the party statutes.
As chair, Slota acquired a slew of rights and powers
including the right to co‐opt an additional and unlimited
number of members of the party Presidium, the formal
right to block and veto any personnel related decisions
of other SNS bodies, and the exclusive right to rank‐order
the candidates on the party’s single national list for par‐
liamentary elections.
Slota’s ignominious departure from the leadership
and his return in 2003 to both the party and its helm
prompted changes to safeguard the position of leader,
thereby providing to all intents and purposes SNS’s old–
new leader with an unconstrained control over the party.
These changes, however, can be seen as continuing
the general direction of travel since the early 1990s. In
formal terms, the party statutes have been amended
11 times since their initial approval in 1990. Although
some changes were provoked by wider political devel‐
opments such as the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the
creation of regional structures of government in Slovakia,
the main trend has been to tighten the control of the
party’s central organs (Hudek, 2004).
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Rather ironically for Slota, the formal power of the
leader was in evidence when he stepped down in 2012
after the party’s poor showing in the elections and as
accusations of misuse of party funds began to esca‐
late. Slota expressed the need to pass the baton to
a new generation of politicians and recommended to
the party congress that his close associate, vice‐chair
Andrej Danko, become leader. Although the anointed
successor praised Slota and recommended the long‐time
leader be elevated to the post of honorary chairman, this
post proved to be purely honorific without any formal
powers. Once enshrined as party chair, Danko moved
against his former political master and was instrumen‐
tal in Slota’s expulsion from the party in 2013 over
mismanagement and financial irregularities (“Jána Slotu
vylúčili,” 2013). The formal decision to cast out SNS’s
long‐time leader was made not by Danko alone, but
by the party’s Presidium. Whilst some of the Presidium
members elected by the SNS congress did not support
the move, the key votes in the Presidium were cast by
members co‐opted by Danko himself, indicating that the
party chair had used his strong formal powers to impose
his will against thewishes of a sizeable portion of the SNS
rank‐and‐file.
Although the party statutes have been amended
since Slota left office, they remain clear about the
elevated position of the party leader. He/she may be
answerable to the party’s Presidium, but the party leader
may select and appoint the members of his leadership
team and the party general secretary without any con‐
straints from other party bodies. Even though the party
deputy chairs are elected by the party congress, the party
leader has the sole right to propose to congress a can‐
didate for the position. More broadly, he/she has the
right of veto over personnel questions. He/she appoints
and dismisses the central election team for national and
European elections, election managers at the local and
regional level, and the party official media spokesper‐
son (Slovenská národná strana, 2019, Article VI § 17).
The party chair also has the final say over who runs for
office on the party ticket. In the run‐up to the 2016 elec‐
tions, for instance, Danko used his leadership prerogative
to dismiss the deputy‐chair and the number six on the
party’s electoral list, Vladimír Chovan. Four years later,
Danko removed another deputy chair, Ján Krišanda, from
the SNS list. The motivations for the two dismissals may
have been different, but both underscored the powers
of the leader (Šnídl, 2016).
The decisive role of the party leader over personnel
questions was also in evidence when SNS agreed to be
part of a coalition government in 2016. Nomination of
non‐party experts is not unusual in Central European pol‐
itics where expertise is venerated, but it was striking that
all three individuals chosen to lead the ministries allo‐
cated to SNS were non‐party technocrats who had not
run in the parliamentary elections. Although publicly jus‐
tifying the nominations on the basis of their expertise,
appointing government ministers with no formal party
affiliation had the benefit of helping forge ties of loyalty
to the leader and helped insulate them from the rest of
SNS’s party organization; all of which further strength‐
ened Danko. The ministers were subsequently invited to
join SNS during the parliamentary term after they had
demonstrated their loyalty and trustworthiness. When
one of them was forced to leave following controversy
surrounding the allocation of European funds, he was
replaced by another non‐party nominee with expertise
who subsequently joined SNS.
In a similar vein, the SNS leader exercised strong con‐
trol over other party nominations. By virtue of being a
governing party in 2016–2020, SNS gained the right to
nominate its people to several semi‐state and public bod‐
ies, such as the Agricultural Paying Agency in charge of
handing subsidies to farmers and state‐owned compa‐
nies including Agrokomplex and Horeza. Subsequently,
one of Danko’s critics revealed no party body ever dis‐
cussed these nominations. Theywere simply the result of
discretionary powers of the party chairman (Hlucháňová,
2020). The centrality of Danko to decision‐making was
also well‐illustrated by his sudden decision in August
2017 to terminate the coalition agreement his party was
part of (which was subsequently amended) much to
the surprise of other members of the SNS leadership
(Terenzani, 2017).
Given all of these examples, it was no surprise that
when Danko’s deputy chairman Zelník resigned after the
disastrous 2020 elections, he claimed the party was fully
controlled by the leader. All the important decisions
were taken by Danko himself and there were no discus‐
sions allowed at the party congress (“Podpredseda SNS
Zelník,” 2020). Formally, however, the party congress is
the most important organ of the party. The congress
is the body that decides the party’s fundamental direc‐
tion, approves the key programmatic documents, and
changes the party statutes themselves. But in reality,
its power is circumscribed and various provisions in the
statutes ensure the key levers of power ultimately rest
in the hands of the party leader. The party congress,
for instance, does have the right to vote to remove the
party’s leader, but only on a recommendation by the
SNS Regional Council (Slovenská národná strana, 2019,
Article VI § 15). The regional chairs, however, can be
dismissed by the party’s Presidium (Slovenská národná
strana, 2019, Article VI § 16). In turn, the Presidium is
very much in the grip of the party leader. Called by the
party leader “according to need, but at least once every
two months” (Slovenská národná strana, 2019, Article VI
§ 16), the Presidium makes many key decisions over the
conduct and organization of the party. However, of its 24
members, one third are nominated and dismissed by the
party leader. Included in the other 16 are the party leader
himself/herself and the deputy chairs (currently seven)
with the others made up of those elected by the party
congress (Slovenská národná strana, 2019, Article VI § 16).
Strikingly, fewer than half of themembers of the new SNS
Presidium elected/appointed in September 2020 nearly
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half (11) were not Presidium members in 2019. The
turnover indicates both Danko’s powerful position and
the primary importance of securing the leader’s position
before any concerted attempts to recruit members.
Timing matters not just in comedy, but also in pol‐
itics. Although the party congress has significant for‐
mal powers, it meets once every four years which has
meant in the past decade it has met shortly after parlia‐
mentary elections are held, depriving the rank‐and‐file
of an opportunity to input into decision‐making or sim‐
ply vent their frustrations. There was a festive congress
held in 2018, but no decisions were taken on the party’s
leadership or programme at that gala, although Danko
did announce he would not run for the presidency of
Slovakia. Deprived of voice, exit becomes the strategy
open to the discontented. Hence, in the run‐up to the
2020 elections, several disaffected high‐profile local and
regional SNS representatives defected to support other
parties like Vlasť (Homeland) and Sme Rodina (We Are
Family). Danko, however, shrugged off the departures by
pointing to the fact that no‐one had left the SNS contin‐
gent in parliament, a striking contrast to all other parlia‐
mentary parties (Šnídl, 2020a).
The role of members also highlights the gap between
the formal and real picture of power. Formally, mem‐
bers of SNS have the right to participate in the creation
and carrying out of the party’s policies, propose candi‐
dates to the organs of the party, participate in party
meetings, and request responses from the chairperson
and other central organs of the party (Slovenská národná
strana, 2019, Article IV §7 No. 1). But in reality they have
limited powers. The power of the SNS leader over the
organizational structures of the party, for instance, was
well illustrated in July 2017 when Eduard Markovič was
removed as the head of SNS in the eastern region of
Prešov. Although the national party leadership had pro‐
posed its own candidate, Markovič was chosen by the
regional body. However, not only was the national lead‐
ership instrumental in Markovič’s recall, but also that
of three other significant figures in the Prešov region,
prompting Markovič to remark that all party members
must accept without question what the chairman says
(“Odvolaný vysoký funkcionár,” 2017).
Danko was initially a popular figure. After the 2016
election he was viewed positively, but this quickly
changed thanks to a series of scandals surrounding the
SNS leader, including plagiarizing his university thesis
and sending flirtatious messages to a woman implicated
in the events surrounding the murders of Kuciak and
Kušnírová. But he was also ridiculed for frequent lack of
linguistic competence in his mother tongue and when
the minister of defence (an SNS‐nominee) promoted
him to the rank of captain. After SNS’s poor perfor‐
mance in the February 2020 elections, Danko announced
he would not seek re‐election as the party’s leader,
claiming it was a time for Slovakia to recharge its bat‐
teries. The party’s poll rating continued to slide, but
Danko changed his mind and ran for re‐election win‐
ning the support of 88 of the 126 delegates at the
party congress in September 2020. His challenger, Anton
Hrnko, responded by announcing his departure and was
followed by dozens of other delegates.
The experience of Danko’s leadership of SNS, there‐
fore, highlights the risks of a party organizational strat‐
egy that endows the party leader with a decisive say
in almost all decisions. It may provide flexibility and an
ability to react swiftly to the changing public mood, but
it makes the party’s fortunes contingent on the captain
of the ship and accords others in the party few options
beyond staying silent or bailing from the boat.
5. Conclusion
In the early 1990s, SNS followed the trend in Slovakia
and built a party organization with branches across the
country and a significant membership. But the most
striking aspect of the party’s organizational structure
was—and remains—the position of the leader. Although
personnel politics and the idiosyncratic history of SNS
explains much about the elevated position of the party
leader, it is important to stress that a low level of intra‐
party democracy in parties in Slovakia is the norm, with
ordinary members having minimal impact on decision‐
making (Dolný & Malová, 2016).
The reformulation of SNS in 2003 in particular
strengthened the position of party leader, relegating
almost everyone else, including ordinary partymembers,
to the role of cheerleaders. Nonetheless, members and
activists played a role in keeping the party alive during its
extra‐parliamentary periods, something the party leader‐
ship was aware of in 2012 as it invested efforts in recruit‐
ing members. It nearly trebled party membership dur‐
ing the four‐year term outside parliament, highlighting
the signalling function membership can have for a party
keen to display its vitality and relevance. Although the
party managed to hold onto these levels of member‐
ship throughout the subsequent parliamentary term, the
scandals of 2016–2020 and the performance of SNS’s
party leader led to a noticeable drop in partisan activity,
the departure of some of those activists to other parties
promoting a national(ist) message, and ultimately to a
disastrous election result leaving the party outside par‐
liament again. Following the election, the party’s mem‐
bership fell by more than half to just 3,469. Previously,
the party also had some significant presence in regional
or local councils, but in 2017 it secured only 15 out
of 416 seats in elections to the regional assemblies. By
early 2021, therefore, SNS appeared to have lostmuch of
the “organizational” and “ideational” resources that aid
party survival (Cyr, 2017) and was still languishing in the
polls. The SNS eagle had not quite transmogrified into a
dead parrot by 2021, but it needed to addressmany chal‐
lenges for it to soar once again.
Placing the experience of SNS in the wider discussion
of the persistence or revival of the mass party model,
SNS has shown some of the traits of a mass party seen
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in other cases discussed in this thematic issue. SNS has
sought to promote a large membership, but its focus
seems to have beenmore onquantity than on the activist
quality stressed in the mass party model. Furthermore,
especially since losing its parliamentary representation
in February 2020, SNS has struggled to provide many on‐
the‐ground activities, although admittedly the Covid‐19
pandemic has made this challenging for all parties. SNS
was never able to be the sole voice—and even strug‐
gled to be the main voice—for Slovak nationalism, mak‐
ing the forging or preservation of a collective identity
much harder. The party was more mass like in aspira‐
tion than in reality, but fell short even in its aspirations.
The model of the mass party becomes less relevant as
parties in decline approach the threshold of survival and
seize upon any resources thatmight offer an escape from
final collapse whether in the form of a rescuing leader,
a radicalization of message, or a reliance on the few
remaining vibrant regional or local organizations.
In the past decade, however, two other parties in
Slovakia that have displayed characteristics of the mass
party are worthy of mention. ĽSNS has been able to
forge a collective identity through its extreme national‐
ist ideology, reinforced by activities for members and
the activism of its membership. ĽSNS, however, suffered
a significant split in January 2021 with several leading
politicians leaving the party. In a strong echo of the SNS
split in 1999, the chances of either (or both) ĽSNS and the
breakaway Republika crossing the parliamentary thresh‐
old at the next election look much slimmer than if they
had remained united. In contrast, one of the other peren‐
nial parties of Slovakia, KDH, which like SNS has also
experienced periods outside of parliament, hasmanaged
to maintain a large activist membership, rootedness on
the ground, and the preservation of a collective iden‐
tity through its associated and ancillary organizations.
The odds of KDH rather than SNS remaining viable by the
time of the next parliamentary elections and crossing the
threshold look much higher. The mass party model may
be derived from the experiences of another century, but
it might provide a recipe for some parties to survive in
the 21st century.
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